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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HILDE B. MONTGOMERY 
(SNITCHLER), 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to review all final judgments and orders 
of the District Court involving domestic relations 
cases pursuant to Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
THE COURT CORRECTLY MODIFIED THE STIPULATION 
WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES 
REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
Case No. 920138-CA 
Priority 16 
- 1 -
A Stipulation based on inaccurate information or 
misrepresentation can be set aside. Gates v. Gates, 
787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990). As long as the Court 
has made adequate factual findings, they should not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous, against the clear 
weight of evidence or the appellate Court determines 
that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error. 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) and 
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from an order granting 
plaintiffs Petition for Modification regarding her 
entitlement to defendant's retirement benefits of the 
Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of 
Utah. 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
The parties were divorced on November 6, 1985. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Decree of Divorce, the 
plaintiff was awarded a one-half interest in the 
defendant's retirement with the appropriate offset for 
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his share of her retirement, all based on the formula 
set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982). 
Shortly after the divorce, the parties entered 
into a Stipulation modifying the Decree, wherein they 
agreed that after the Woodward formula was applied to 
the parties' respective retirements, the plaintiff 
would be entitled to receive $400,00 per month from the 
defendant's retirement which would begin concurrently 
with the defendant's civil service retirement. 
On November 2, 1990, the parties entered into a 
new Stipulation wherein the plaintiff agreed that she 
would settle her full claims against the defendant's 
retirement by having the retirement office pay her the 
lump sum of $8,100.00 during the same time the 
defendant received the remaining portion of his lump 
sum entitlement. 
On August 13, 1991, the plaintiff filed her 
Petition for Modification. A trial was held 
January 8, 1992, at which time the Court announced its 
decision from the bench. Specific Findings of Fact and 
Order were subsequently prepared and signed by the 
Court on February 6, 1992. They are attached as an 
Addendum to this Brief. 
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III. Disposition at Trial Court. 
The Court found that the defendant had 
misrepresented to the plaintiff what the retirement 
benefits were and never conveyed to her what her actual 
entitlement was or could be, and that misrepresentation 
caused the plaintiff to enter into the Stipulation 
dated November 2, 1990. Accordingly, the Court set 
aside that Stipulation and entered a new Order which 
closely approximated that which had been granted to the 
plaintiff at the time of the original divorce. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on June 13, 1964. As a 
result of the marriage, two children were born. (R 1) 
During the course of the marriage, defendant 
accumulated 21.6 years of civil service retirement 
benefits and the plaintiff accumulated 2.6 years of 
civil service retirement benefits. (R 61) 
The parties were divorced on November 6, 1985. 
Among other things, the plaintiff waived any claim for 
alimony. (R 52) She was also awarded one-half of 
defendant's retirement, with the appropriate offset for 
his share of her retirement based upon the formula set 
forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982). 
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(R 52) The Decree of Divorce was signed 
December 16f 1985. (R 56) 
On December 28, 1985, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation modifying the retirement portion of the 
Decree of Divorce just referred to. The parties agreed 
the plaintiff would be awarded the specific sum of 
$400.00 per month as her share of defendant's 
retirement which was to begin in the month the 
defendant retired and continue so long as he was 
entitled to his retirement. The Stipulation took into 
account the retirement the plaintiff had accumulated in 
her own right through civil service employment. The 
Order implementing the Stipulation was signed by the 
Court on January 8, 1986. (R 58-61) 
Sometime in approximately August of 1990, the 
plaintiff met with Ogden Attorney Paul T. Kunz because 
the defendant had approached her and asked her if she 
would consent to his taking a lump sum settlement of 
his retirement benefits. A proposed Stipulation for 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order had been prepared by 
defendant's attorney and she wanted Attorney Kunz to 
review it and see whether it was in her interest to 
sign the Stipulation. (T 8-9) 
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The Stipulation provided: 
1. The plaintiff has left government 
service early and has received a one-
time payment of her retirement 
contributions. Defendant by agreement 
signed the release of said funds to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff in return 
signed a waiver of any right she may 
have against the lump sum of the 
defendant's ctlternative annuity with 
lump sum. 
3. The retirement administrator will 
not honor the written waiver of 
plaintiff without a modification of 
the divorce Decree. 
4. The parties agree a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order may be issued 
authorizing the plan administrator to 
pay retirement as follows: 
a. In the event defendant chooses 
the alternative annuity with lump 
sum payment, defendant shall 
receive all of the lump sum. 
b. Plaintiff shall receive one-
half of fifty-five percent of the 
monthly retirement check due to 
defendant each month. 
c. In January of 1986, the monthly 
amount was then calculated to be 
$400.00 per month. This amount may 
vary depending on the actual monthly 
amount paid as determined at the 
time of actual retirement. 
5. This agreement is to supersede any 
existing order and to become the 
governing la.w between the parties. 
6. The parties agree to execute such 
documents as may be required to affect 
their intent as expressed herein. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) 
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In an effort to properly advise the plaintiff, 
Mr. Kunz called retirement individuals at Hill Air 
Force Base and subsequently called the Office of 
Personnel Management in Washington, D.C. to obtain 
additional information concerning alternatives 
available to the plaintiff. Based on the information 
Mr. Kunz received, he came to the conclusion that both 
parties either had to accept the lump sum benefit or 
both parties had to accept the monthly benefit and that 
one party could not pull out the lump sum and then the 
secondary party receive monthly benefits. It was also 
his understanding that if the lump sum benefit was to 
be accepted, there would be no further benefits. 
(T 10-12) 
Because of that information, defendant's attorney 
prepared a new Stipulation wherein the plaintiff agreed 
the defendant could apply for his lump sum distribution 
and she would be entitled to receive $8,100.00 of that 
lump sum payment as her share of the defendant's 
retirement benefits. Admittedly, the new Stipulation 
provides: 
Upon payment of the twenty-seven 
percent of the lump sum totally 
(sic) approximately $8,100.00, 
no further sums shall be paid to 
the plaintiff and any remaining 
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rights or benefits shall be the 
exclusive property of the 
defendant. Plaintiff waives all 
other rights, present and future 
in the defendant's retirement, 
including any annuity or regular 
retirement benefits. (R 68-69) 
Before signing the Stipulation, Mr. Kunz 
explained to the plaintiff that: 
It's my understanding that if you 
go with a lump sum, neither one of 
you will receive any monthly 
payments, that they make you go 
strictly one way or the other and 
that we don't have any alternative. 
(T 12) 
According to Mr. Kunz, the plaintiff indicated 
that: 
Well, if that is the case, he had 
consented for me to take out my lump 
sum. I feel that I am sort of honor 
bound to let him do it. (T 12-13) 
Mr. Kunz further testified that had he known that 
in addition to the lump sum payment benefit 
Mr. Montgomery was applying for he would have also been 
entitled to go on receiving monthly retirement 
payments, he never would have agreed to sign the 
Stipulation with the plaintiff. It was clear to him 
that the mathematics of an $8,100.00 lump sum 
settlement versus $400.00 per month indefinitely was 
not a good bargain if both were available. (T 13) 
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During the trial, the defendant introduced 
defendant's Exhibit 1. The second sheet of the 
Exhibit is a document entitled Alternative Annuity 
Election. Option 2 of that form was signed by the 
parties which indicated that the defendant was electing 
to take an alternative annuity with lump sum payment 
and the plaintiff was consenting to that alternative 
annuity election. Although the form does refer to a 
monthly annuity in addition to the lump sum payment, no 
annuity amount or other information was provided on 
that form. The third sheet of Exhibit 1, another 
Alternative Annuity Election form, had all of the 
blanks filled in and had been signed by the defendant 
on March 14, 1991. This document was not signed by the 
plaintiff. It revealed that had the defendant decided 
to retire without making a request for a lump sum 
payment, he would have received a regular monthly 
annuity of $1,914.00. By making the lump sum 
alternative election, however, he received a lump sum 
payment of $29,774.17 plus an on-going monthly annuity 
of $1,776.00. 
The plaintiff testified that when she signed the 
second sheet of defendant's Exhibit 1 on 
October 10, 1989, she did not know that in addition to 
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the lump sum payment, the defendant would be receiving 
an additional monthly annuity retirement benefit. Had 
she known that information, she would not have signed 
an agreement waiving any monthly annuity. (T 37) At 
the time the plaintiff signed the specific waiver, she 
indicated that she asked for a copy of the 
informational cover sheet, which was page 1 of 
defendant's Exhibit 1, and she stated that: 
The lady notary had it and was 
going to copy it, and he ripped 
it out of her hands. I don't 
have anything and he would not 
let me have it either. (T 31) 
The fact that defendant was receiving a monthly 
annuity in addition to the lump sum was brought to 
light primarily because the plaintiff did not receive 
her $8,100.00 lump sum share after the defendant 
retired. He had already received approximately 
$17,000.00 of his lump sum benefits (T 17) and as of 
the date of the hearing, the plaintiff had not received 
anything. (T 37) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court entered 
its findings and order, finding that the defendant 
failed to convey to the plaintiff what the actual 
entitlement was, that when she signed page 2 of 
Exhibit 1 it was in blank and that left her with the 
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understanding that the only benefit available would be 
the lump sum payment for a total settlement and that 
this lack of information constituted the 
misrepresentation. (T 48-51) and (R 110-116) The 
specific Finding provides: 
10. At the time the plaintiff 
signed defendant's Exhibit 1, 
the defendant deliberately 
misrepresented to the plaintiff 
what the benefits were and never 
conveyed to her what her actual 
entitlement was or could be. 
This misrepresentation caused 
the plaintiff to enter into the 
Stipulated dated November 2, 1990. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff entered into a Stipulation based 
upon misinformation. The defendant did not provide all 
relevant facts to her when he asked her to agree to 
modify an earlier retirement Stipulation. The trial 
Court exercised its equitable power to modify the 
Stipulation and restore the plaintiff to the position 
she would have been in had the true facts been known. 
The Order should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT CORRECTLY MODIFIED THE STIPULATION 
WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ENTERED INTO BY THE 
PARTIES REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO 
DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
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The case of Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah 
App. 1990) is closely analogous to this case. 
In Gates, the trial Court modified a Stipulation 
increasing child support which had been entered into by 
the parties. The Court did so, acknowledging there had 
been no material changes in circumstances, but justified 
the modification because of Mr. Gates' failure to 
disclose his true income. The failure to disclose was 
not really an express misrepresentation as much as it 
was an omission of facts given to his ex-wife. 
In Gates, as in this case, appellant contended 
that it was error to modify a Stipulation absent a 
change in circumstances; there was no actual 
misrepresentation? and, since Mrs. Gates was 
represented by counsel, she had a duty to ascertain the 
true facts. 
On appeal, the Court held that: 
Since respondent did not have accurate 
information about appellant's income 
at the time she executed the 
Stipulation, the trial Court did not 
err in modifying its prior order 
based on that Stipulation. A party 
may not obtain a Stipulation based 
on a misrepresentation or material 
omission of facts and later claim 
that a child support order cannot 
be modified because there has been 
no material change in circumstances 
based on those same undisclosed or 
misrepresented facts. at 1346 
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The Gates case did seem to create some limitation 
to this rule when it cited Myers v.Myers, 768 P.2d 979 
(Utah App. 1989) holding that contract theories of 
bargain and waiver can be applied to stipulations 
involving property distribution, but not "to issues 
which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the 
Court, such as child custody and support". at 1346. 
That limitation, if it is one, should be inapplicable 
to this case because we are dealing with a form of 
support for Mrs. Snitchler. When the Woodward formula 
was created by the Supreme Court in 1982, they refered 
to pension benefits as an "economic resource subject to 
equitable distribution". 
Alternatively, the Myers holding should be 
narrowed to permit an additional exception to a case 
such as this. Even better would be to eliminate the 
limitation altogether. It makes little sense in cases 
of equity to allow a person to profit from active or 
passive misinformation knowingly relied upon by the 
other party. 
This had been a marriage of forty-one years. 
During that time, Mr. Montgomery was able to accumulate 
21.6 years of civil service retirement while Mrs. 
Montgomery only accumulated 2.6 years. Her original 
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Stipulation entitlement of Mr. Montgomery's retirement 
was to be $400.00 per month commencing at his 
retirement. This took into account her own civil 
service retirement benefit amount. 
Had Mr. Montgomery elected not to request a lump 
sum payment, he would have received $1,914.00 per 
month, less the $400.00 due Mrs. Montgomery. By 
electing the lump sum payment, his monthly annuity is 
only reduced to $1,776.00 and he received $29,774.00 
cash. He wants to be forgiven of any further 
obligation to his former wife by paying her $8,100.00 
out of his cash settlement. That result is not logical 
or equitable. 
Mr. Montgomery argues that he has radically 
changed his position by retiring and he only did so in 
reliance on the Stipulation signed by his ex-wife. He 
claims he would have continued to work had he known she 
would attempt to back out of the Stipulation. His 
argument belies the facts. The first Stipulation he 
presented to her for signing provided that she would 
receive one-half of fifty-five percent of his monthly 
retirement check if she would waive any claim to the 
lump sum distribution. As it turns out, had she signed 
that Stipulation, he would have received and kept 
- 14 -
$29,774.00 and she would have started receiving $488.40 
per month ($1,776.00 x .55% x 1/2). This is what he 
wanted in the first place. Had she signed it, he still 
would have retired. She is not asking for anything 
more. She does not want any of his lump sum. She just 
wants her monthly entitlement. She didn't sign that 
Stipulation believing that if he elected the lump sum, 
she could not get a monthly annuity. Mr. Montgomery 
was aware of, or should have been aware of, this 
misunderstanding. This omission of accurate 
information has caused her to radically alter her 
entitlement. The Court's Order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court has the right and equitable power 
to modify a Stipulation entered into based upon 
omissions of material facts. The Court-ordered 
modification should be affirmed. 
DATED this \ \ — day of June, 1992. 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee, 
postage prepaid, to Donald C. Hughes, Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, 298-24th Street #125, Ogden, 
UT 84401, on this day oivJune, 1992. 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Order. 
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Brian R. Florence #1091 
of FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818-26th Street 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HILDE B. MONTGOMERY-
(SNITCHLER) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 850737455 
Hon. Douglas L. Cornaby 
FLORENCE 
and 
[UTCHISON 
fcOFESSIONAL 
JRPORATION 
rTORNEYSAT 
LAW 
-26TH STREET 
EN, UTAH 84401 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 8th 
day of January, 1992, pursuant to plaintiff's Petition for 
Modification, plaintiff present and represented by counsel, 
Brian R. Florence, and defendant present and represented by 
counsel, Donald C. Hughes, and the Court having been fully 
advised in the premise, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The above-named parties were divorced on 
November 6, 1985, at which time the plaintiff was "awarded 
one-half of defendant's retirement, with the appropriate 
offset for defendant's share of her retirement, based on the 
formula set forth in Woodward". 
2. The parties thereafter entered into a Stipulation 
that after calculating the defendant's regular civil service 
?\mm 
FLORENCE 
and 
TOTCHISON 
ROFESSIONAL 
:ORTORATION 
kTTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
8 - 26TH STREET 
DEN, UTAH 84401 
MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY 
Civil No. 850737455 
Findings of Fact and Order 
Page 2 
years and deducting the plaintiff's civil service years, that 
the plaintiff would be entitled to a monthly annuity in the 
sum of $400.00 which would represent her full Woodward share 
in the defendant's retirement benefits at such time as he 
retired. 
3. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order was prepared 
and submitted to the government retirement office awarding to 
the plaintiff a $400.00 monthly benefit from the defendant's 
retirement which would begin upon his retirement. 
4. In October of 1989, the plaintiff signed a form at 
the defendant's request agreeing to permit him to obtain a 
lump sum retirement payment. This form was introduced as 
part of defendant's Exhibit 1. There were no other 
attachments to the form signed by the plaintiff and there was 
nothing on the form that would indicate to the plaintiff the 
amount of annuity she would be receiving or that she was 
waiving. 
5. In the summer of 1990, the defendant asked the 
plaintiff to sign a Stipulation wherein she would waive all 
claims to his lump sum retirement payment in exchange for 
one-half of 55% of his monthly annuity benefit. This 
Stipulation was marked as plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and 
introduced into evidence. 
II 
MONTGOMERY (SNITCHLER) v. MONTGOMERY 
Civil No. 850737455 
Findings of Fact and Order 
Page 3 
6. The plaintiff consulted with Attorney Paul Kunz and 
was led to believe that a lump sum retirement benefit could 
not be paid and additionally preserve a monthly annuity 
retirement benefit. 
7. Thereafter, the plaintiff entered into a 
Stipulation with the defendant to receive 27% of his lump sum 
retirement payment or the approximate amount of $8,100.00 in 
lieu of the monthly annuity benefit she had earlier received 
in connection with the divorce. The plaintiff believed that 
civil service regulations prohibited her or the defendant 
from receiving a lump sum retirement benefit and monthly 
annuity benefits. 
8. When it came time for the plaintiff to receive her 
lump sum payment, she learned that the defendant had received 
a portion of his lump sum payment and was also receiving a 
monthly annuity benefit. 
9. As an additional part of defendant's Exhibit 1, it 
is determined that had defendant not agreed to accept a lump 
sum retirement benefit, his monthly annuity would have been 
$1,914.00. By electing to receive the lump sum benefit, his 
monthly annuity benefit would be reduced to $1,776.00. His 
lump sum retirement benefit that he is entitled to receive is 
$29,774.00. 
A d Q O ^ R O 
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10. At the time the plaintiff signed defendant's 
Exhibit 1, the defendant deliberately misrepresented to the 
plaintiff what the benefits were and never conveyed to her 
what her actual entitlement was or could be. This 
misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to enter into the 
Stipulation dated November 2, 1990. 
11. The defendant retired effective December 1, 1990 
and has received approximately $17,000.00 of his lump sum 
benefits and is also receiving $1,776.00 per month retirement 
annuity benefits. The plaintiff has received nothing to 
date. 
12. The defendant retired earlier than he might 
otherwise have retired believing that the plaintiff would be 
making no further claim on any future annuity rights and as 
a result, his monthly benefit has been diminished some by 
reason of his lump sum retirement election. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and files its: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation entered into 
by the plaintiff on November 2, 1990 and the corresponding 
QDRO that was issued as a result of that Stipulation is set 
aside. 
/\ /» r\ c* r+t r* -* 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under the circumstances of 
defendant's early retirement and the misrepresentations that 
have occurred, the plaintiff should not have the benefit of 
both a part of defendant's lump sum retirement payment and 
his lump sum annuity. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant is awarded all of 
the lump sum retirement pursuant to his election. Effective 
with his retirement on December 1, 1990, the plaintiff is 
entitled to 27% of each monthly annuity amount paid to the 
defendant or owed to the defendant by the civil service 
retirement office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a new Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order should be issued to the civil service 
retirement office directing them to forthwith pay to the 
plaintiff 27% of the defendant's monthly annuity benefit 
effective immediately and that all prior orders and elections 
previously received by them are deemed rescinded and void. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that until the civil service 
retirement office begins sending the plaintiff her 
proportionate retirement share, the defendant is directed to 
begin paying her effective with the month of January, 1991, 
the sum of $400.00 per month towards this amount. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as soon as it is calculated 
FLORENCE 
and 
[UTCHISON 
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ORPORATION 
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as to how much the defendant has received for the months from 
and including December,, 1990 through December, 1991, and any 
difference between the amount that the plaintiff is actually 
entitled to and the $400.00 that the defendant pays her 
beginning with January, 1991, until the plaintiff starts 
receiving retirement benefits directly, shall be owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff. As soon as that specific amount 
is determined, the defendant should make arrangements to pay 
the plaintiff that amount. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of February, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
vrU. 
CL. CORNABY, Judge 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT 
TO DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS COUNSEL: 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, you are hereby notified that the undersigned 
will hold the original hereof for a period of five days from 
the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient 
time to file any written objections to the form of the 
foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. 
If no objections to the form are filed within that time, the 
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OFESSIONAL 
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original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature 
and filing. / 
this /(J day of February, 1992. 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
DATED 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Order, postage prepaid, 
to Donald C. Hughes, Attorney for defendant, 520-26th Street 
#206, Ogden, UT 84401, on this JO day of February, 1992. 
EIL-EEN CHR'ISTE'NSEN 
Secretary 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HILDE B. MONTGOMERY 
(SNITCHLER), 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
FILED 
JUN 2 6 1992 
0 F
 APPEALS 
Case No. 920138-CA 
Priority 16 
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
There are no Constitutions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules 
or Regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this 
case. 
DATED this "~H'l day of June, 1992. 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
3RIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Supplement to Brief of Appellee, 
postage prepaid, to Donald C. Hughes, Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, 298-24th Street #125, Ogden, 
UT 84401, on this gX^VL-day of June, 1992. 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
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